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ALLOCATION OF SUPERFUND LIABILITY:
CAPPING THE MUNICIPALITIES' SHAREt
WALTER E. MUGDAN*
W E in EPA are of the opinion, born of long experience, that stat-
utes may be interesting, regulations may be relevant, but it is
Agency policy which is dispositive. And the area of municipal liability
raises all sorts of interesting legal, factual and policy questions. This
debate identifies all three.
Now let us pose a few of those questions. First, as a matter of law,
can generation and transportation of municipal solid waste create
CERCLA' liability at the disposal site? And for the sake of this dis-
cussion, let us make sure we all have the same common understanding
of municipal solid waste. When we use this term, or the acronym
MSW, we are going to talk about your common, garden-variety
household garbage: the garbage that you and I throw out every day
and that the garbage guys come and pick up. That is municipal solid
waste. We are not talking about industrial waste, even though some-
times a municipality might pick up some of that industrial waste.
That is the "matter of law" question. Let us go further and look at
it as a question of fact. Assuming the answer to the first question is
yes, what kind of evidentiary proof is going to be needed to support
such a claim of liability?
And finally, as a matter of policy, if liability can be assigned to
MSW generators and transporters, how should the liability be allo-
cated between them and traditional industrial waste generators?
Let us review the existing law a little bit and see where we are.
First, let us remind ourselves of the basis of liability under CERCLA
with respect to a site m which there has to be a response action as the
result of a release or threatened release of hazardous substances. One
is liable for the cost of response at that site if one is: (1) an owner of
the site; (2) an operator of the site (including past owners or operators
at the time the disposal in question took place); (3) the transporter
who brought the wastes, the hazardous substances, to the site (provid-
t Tis speech was presented at the Fordham Symposium, Superfund
Reauthorization: Agenda for the '90s, held at Fordham University School of Law on
March 11, 1994.
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1. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980), amended by the Superfund Amend-
ments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986)
(codified m scattered sections of the Internal Revenue Code and Titles 10, 29, 33, and
42 of the United States Code) [hereinafter CERCLA].
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mg the transporter selected the site); or (4) and most importantly, the
generator.2 (CERCLA does not use the word "generator," but refers
to one who arranges for the disposal or treatment of hazardous sub-
stances at the site. Actually, CERCLA does not say that; it is impossi-
ble to understand what CERCLA really says with respect to
generators, but that is what we understand it to mean.)
In defining hazardous substances, CERCLA incorporates four
other laws. A RCRA3 hazardous waste is also a CERCLA hazardous
substance. If it is a TSCA4 regulated toxic substance, a Clean Air Act
hazardous air pollutant,5 or a Clean Water Act regulated toxic pollu-
tant,6 then it is also, by reference, a CERCLA hazardous substance.7
Under CERCLA, there is no express limitation regarding the con-
centration of the material.8 It does not matter how diluted it is. If it is
one of those substances that is in one of the other laws, it is a CER-
CLA hazardous substance. 9 It does not matter what the quantity is.
Theoretically, even a molecule would be enough.
We have to look particularly at RCRA, because it is the RCRA list
of hazardous wastes which contributes the largest number of chemi-
cals to the CERCLA hazardous substance list. It is important to rec-
ognize that all those bizarre details in the RCRA rules do not apply in
the CERCLA context.
To be a RCRA hazardous waste, a particular substance has to fit all
sorts of bizarre definitions having to do with the source of the waste,
the nature of the product, or the source of the industrial operation
that generated the waste, and so on.' 0 None of those are applicable.
The only question in Superfund is whether the substance is one of
those chemicals which is listed in the RCRA list as a hazardous
waste." If the answer is yes, then it is a CERCLA hazardous sub-
stance, and those other rules don't apply.
Note well that under RCRA, muicipal solid waste is excluded from
the definition of RCRA hazardous wastes.' 2 But that exclusion does
not apply to Superfund.
Now let us review the facts about muicipal solid waste and why all
of this is an issue. The fact is that study after study has shown that
municipal solid waste - household garbage - will contain approxi-
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1988).
3. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat.
2795 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901 - 6992(h) (1988)) [hereinafter RCRA].
4. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1988) [hereinafter TSCA].
5. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (1988).
6. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a) (1988).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (1988).
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(h) (1988).
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(h) (1988).
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mately one-half percent to one percent,' 3 by weight or volume, haz-
ardous substances. Where does it come from? Well, it comes from all
of our household materials. It comes from cleansers. It comes from
nail polish, nail polish remover, paint cans and all kinds of things.
Another fact. When a Superfund site 14 is a mixed waste site, where
both municipal solid waste and industrial chemical wastes exist, mu-
nicipal solid waste typically constitutes the largest volume by far that
went to that site. So mixed waste sites are usually big landfills which
took in a lot of garbage and also accepted some industrial chemical
wastes. The volume of the muicipal solid waste is by far the domi-
nant one, and drives up the response costs. When you have to do a
clean-up, it ends up being a very key component in how much the
response costs are going to be.'5
These sites are physically very large. They might be 60, 80, or 100
acres in size. If the remedial response for such a site is putting a big
cap over the top of it, or maybe putting a slurry wall around the side
of it, the cost of that is going to be determined by the physical area
that has to be covered. If you are dealing with a municipal landfill,
then you are going to be concerned with a very large space.
In Superfund site clean-ups, allocation among responsible parties
has traditionally been by volume. Suppose you sent ten pounds and I
sent 100 pounds, and this guy over there sent 1,000 pounds. We
should be paying in proportionate shares. And there has traditionally
not been much discounting among the PRPs with respect to things like
concentration or dilution. It has been largely a volume-driven system.
Even though it is difficult to generalize here, volume certainly has
been a driving force.
If municipal solid waste renders a municipality liable, and if the vol-
ume test is used, then the municipality would end up paying a very
large share at these big mixed-waste sites. And by the way, those sites
represent roughly one-fifth of all sites on the Superfund list.'6
Now, let us look at the policy. In 1989, EPA formalized a policy
which simply adopted past practice. It said that if the muicipality is a
generator or transporter of municipal solid waste (i.e. household
waste), then EPA will not prosecute them as a PRP in a CERCLA
site. 7 As an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, EPA simply will not
prosecute. But, if the municipality is the generator or transporter of
traditional, 8 real honest to goodness hazardous substances, EPA will
13. B.F Goodrich v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1197 (2d Cir. 1992) [hereinafter
Goodrich I1].
14. Mr. Mugdan later commented, m response to a question from the audience,
that the average site now costs about $25 million to $30 million.
15. Goodrich 11, 958 F.2d at 1197
16. Clean Sites, Inc., Main Street Meets Superfund: Local Government at
Superfund Hazardous Waste Sites, 5 (Jan. 1992).
17. 54 Fed. Reg. 51,071 (Dec. 12, 1989).
18. Id.
1994]
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prosecute. If a municipal garage that maintains vehicles that gener-
ated waste solvents subsequently places them into the landfill, it is
liable. If the municipality for one reason or another picked up wastes
of an industrial or chemical nature from operations in its area, it might
as well be liable for that as well.19
Where the municipality is the owner/operator of the facility, it can
be liable like any other owner/operator.20 The Superfund is not there
just to bail out the municipality every time it ends up being the owner/
operator of a Superfund site. But if its connection to the Superfund
site is merely as a generator or transporter of MSW, EPA will not
prosecute.
EPA did not pretend that this was a legal interpretation. It said that
this was an exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Let us review the case law One case has basically defined the law
of municipal liability. It is the B.F. Goodrich v Murtha2' case. In
1991, there was a District Court opimon which was appealed.' The
Second Circuit rendered opinions in 1992 and 1993, ordering the court
below to continue the case based on the Second Circuit opinion.
Then, in 1993, there were two District Court opinions, both in light of
the Second Circuit opimon.'
In 1991, a third-party action was brought by industrial-type genera-
tors against municipal solid waste generators. The MSW generators
moved for summary judgment and said that, as a matter of law, they
were not liable. They listed numerous reasons. They cited EPA pol-
icy, among other reasons, as if it were a binding interpretation of
law 24 They cited the RCRA exclusion for MSW, and claimed that
this exclusion really should apply in the CERCLA context.' Further-
more, they cited their own status as sovereigns.26
The district court discarded all of those arguments because it has
generally been proven that MSW usually does contain some amount
of hazardous substances. This has, however, not been argued by the
municipalities themselves, nor has it been debated.2 7 As a matter of
law therefore, MSW generators are not off the hook. If the plaintiffs
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Goodrich I, 958 F.2d at 1192.
22. B.F Goodrich v. Murtha, 754 F Supp. 960 (D. Conn. 1991) [hereinafter Good-
rich 1].
23. B.F Goodrich v. Murtha, 840 F.Supp. 180 (D. Conn. 1993) [hereinafter Good-
rich III]; B.F Goodrich v. Murtha, 815 F Supp. 539 (D. Conn. 1993) [hereinafter
Goodrich IV].
24. Goodrich 1, 754 F Supp. at 967
25. Id. at 965.
26. Id. at 961.
27. Id. at 966.
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can show that the MSW generator had hazardous substances and sent
them to the site, the municipality is liable just like anyone else?8
The Second Circuit in 1992 affirmed that view.2 9 It confirmed that
there is nothing m the Superfund law that endorses or incorporates
RCRA exclusions for MSW, nor is there any language about sover-
eigns being somehow immune. There is nothing that distinguishes
mumcipalities from any other kind of PRP.30 The only question is, did
they or did they not send hazardous substances to the Superfund site?
The case was sent back to the district court level to decide the issue.
In 1993, the district court entertained all sorts of further motions,
and rendered two decisions, one in January, and the other in Decem-
ber. The mumcipalities, I think, should be extremely happy about
what they heard from that court. The court concluded that the plain-
tiffs could not prove, as a matter of fact, that the municipalities had
sent hazardous substances to the particular site in question. Of
course, these events had taken place in the rather far past - some ten
to twenty years ago. So, although the plaintiffs could provide experts
who could attempt to allocate liability there was not enough proof to
show that a municipality sent a hazardous substance to the particular
Superfund disposal site.31 As a result, almost all the claims against
mumcipalities which were based solely on municipal solid waste-con-
taining hazardous substances were thrown out. The municipalities
were awarded summary judgment. Their motions to dismiss were gen-
erally accepted by the courts and they were let out of the case.
So, as a matter of fact, the mumcipalities have won, while as a mat-
ter of law, they had lost. The facts end up being quite important in
these cases after all.
Let us look at the Administration's Bill32 and what effects the Bill
has had in the area of municipal liability. The Bill has identified that
the municipality could be liable.33 The Administration did not disa-
gree with the Second Circuit nor the original district court opinion on
that basis. But as a matter of policy, the Administration is proposing
that the liability of all municipal PRPs at a given site be capped in the
aggregate at no more than ten percent of the total cost of that site.34
As I understand it, the Bill says that regardless of the actual allo-
cated share that municipal solid waste generators might be assigned
by the allocator, (who has been identified pursuant to section 122(a)
of this proposed statute), the share is capped at ten percent regardless
of total waste deposited. If the allocator says that the mumcipalities,
28. Id.
29. Goodrich II, 958 F.2d at 1192.
30. Id. at 1205.
31. Goodrich IV, 815 F Supp. at 543-46.
32. Superfund Reform Act of 1994, S. 1834, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1994).
33. Id.
34. Id. § 403.
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as a group, are liable for two percent, or one percent, then, that is
what they ought to pay But if the allocator says that the mumicpali-
ties, as a group, are liable for twenty or forty percent of the costs of
the Superfund site, then municipalities will have to pay only ten
percent.
Presumably, under the allocation scheme in section 122(a), the dif-
ference between the ten percent cap and such greater percentages as
the allocator may assign is considered an "orphan share."35 The "or-
phan share" would therefore have to be picked up by the Fund36 or
paid for by any other designated means of payment for orphan
shares.37
The Administration's Bill contains a de micromis exception. One
who generates or transports less than 500 pounds of municipal solid
waste to a Superfund site is entirely exempt from liability.38 For ex-
ample, if you have a summer cottage in the country and at the end of
the summer you take two or three bags of garbage to the local landfill,
and the landfill eventually becomes a Superfund site, you probably
will not be liable.
One final observation about the Administration Bill. Interestingly
enough, for the liability purposes and the caps on liability proposed
for municipalities, it lumps together municipal solid waste and sewage
sludge.39 Additionally, sewage sludge is defined quite broadly and ex-
pansively to mean any sludge that comes out of the sewage treatment
facility 40 The definition does not concern itself with whether that
sludge is really clean sewage sludge of the type we would all like to
have in our backyards on our vegetable garden, or whether it is the
kind that has occasionally been seen at Superfund sites containing all
kinds of nasty chemicals, such as heavy metals.
There does not seem to be a distinction made in the law. These
municipalities would enjoy the ten percent cap. Yet, an allocator who
sees a lot of sewage sludge at a Superfund site and concludes that such
sewage sludge in fact did contain a lot of hazardous constituents,
might assign a higher allocation than ten percent, or might elevate the
allocation as a result of that fact.
35. With respect to municipal solid waste, the orphan share is defined as the dif-
ference between the aggregate shares that, as the allocator determines on the basis of
the information presented, are specifically attributable to contributors of mumcipal
solid waste subject to the limitations in section 1085(d) of this Title, and the share
actually assumed by those parties in any settlement with the United States pursuant to
subsection 122(g) of this Title.
36. Mr. Mugdan also suggested that the $300 million set aside for the orphan's
share would be used up very quickly, and that given the 10% cap, mumcipal and
industrial landfills could be one of the biggest drains on it.
37. S. 1834, § 702.
38. Id. § 403.
39. Id. § 605(41).
40. Id. § 605(44).
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I have been asked to discuss the basis in the Adminstration's Bill
for capping municipal liability at ten percent. In the aggregate,
whether there's one mumcipality or a hundred of them that are in-
volved, why ten percent, and why is that an aggregate cap9
I don't have a very good answer for that, I was not privy to the
decision-making. It is, as best as I can tell (and as any such cap would
be), an arbitrary number. There was a time when EPA dabbled with
the idea of having a cap of four percent as a matter of policy. That is
to say, we would have been willing to settle with mumcipalities in the
aggregate for not more than four percent of the cost of clean-up, and
thus by settling with them, we would have given them contribution
protection and essentially capped their liability at four percent. Some
were bringing up that proposal at the time the Administration Bill was
written, and the number increased to ten percent, but it still strikes me
as being, by definition, an arbitrary number. Whether it's capricious
or not we will have to judge for ourselves.
What happens to the $300 million orphan share fund? I guess my
expectation is that this fund will be used up pretty quickly, and large
mixed waste (i.e., municipal and industrial landfills) could be one of
the biggest drains. I think, really, the biggest dram on the orphan
fund would be if the allocated share to an owner operator is fifty per-
cent or seventy-five percent of the cost of clean-up (and I think there's
really only two or three district court opinions that have ever touched
on that) and that share is going to be allocated to the owner/operators,
who are typically the old peach farmers who carved up the back forty
and made it into a landfill, there is going to be very large orphan
shares out there that have to be borne. So I can only assume that the
$300 million might be exhausted quite quickly
With respect to mumcipal solid waste, the orphan share is defined
as the difference between the aggregate shares that are specifically
attributable to contributors of mumcipal solid waste subject to the
limtations in section 1085(d) of this Title, and the share actually as-
sumed by those parties in any settlement with the U.S. pursuant to
subsection 122(g) of this Title. The allocator is limited to ten percent
and there may be some internal agency legislative history that will
confirm that that's their meaning. In fact, if the Goodrich principles
are applied, allocators may end up determining that there really is no
basis for finding liability at all, or that the liability is very low, which
takes into account evidentiary concerns. So this may not be a big
drain on the orphan fund; but with the sewage sludge in there, and the
possibility for contamination in sewage sludge, there may be some
large figures that ultimately come forth.
There are a lot of changes, however, that have been suggested in the
nature of techmcal glitches. The Bill itself was drafted fairly rapidly in
response to some Congressional deadlines, and in fact, headquarters
1994]
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admitted that there were a lot of things that slipped through and will
need to be clarified, and this is one of those provisions.
So there are some interesting things in the Administration's Bill.
We will see how it all plays out.
41
41. Mr. Mugdan offered that one of the reasons EPA shied away from binding
arbitration was the need for 30 to 50 additional admimstrative law judges, along with
the burden of the additional case load which would be given to the regional staff.
